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I.

Introduction

An aging nuclear reactor sits in Kinshasa, Congo. It was developed in the 1950s,
as part of the American effort to win over popular appeal during the Cold War. Like all
contemporary nuclear reactors in use, it is powered by materials that could, by remote
possibility, be converted into a nuclear weapon. During some of the more difficult times
in Congo’s recent history, this reactor has sat unmonitored by local and international
authorities; as the Bush administration looked for reasons to start a war with Iraq, this
reactor was occasionally mentioned as a source of material for Saddam Hussein’s nuclear
weapon.1 The problems associated with reactors like this have motivated contemporary
foreign policy, and the implications of this policy (or lack thereof), are the subject matter
of this paper.
The evolution of the nuclear technology has presented policy challenges to the
United States, both domestically and abroad, in dealing with the problems of nuclear
technology. Clearly, there are advantages to nuclear energy. It is relatively inexpensive
for the amount of energy produced, meaning it can be used in relatively fossil fuel poor
nations. It does not emit carcinogenic air pollution or carbon dioxide, making it an
important component for any nation coming to terms with air pollution. There are
obvious drawbacks to the technology. The waste generated by the nuclear fuel cycle is
extremely dangerous and must be kept away from humans. Nuclear plants, with a remote
capability for accident and remote possibility of a terrorist attack, require a great deal of
security and bureaucratic oversight, thus making their use very expensive. There is also
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the relationship between civilian and military applications of nuclear technology, posing
a number of modern challenges to policymakers.
This paper examines that relationship between military applications and civilian
uses of that technology, focusing on the methods taken by the United States to address
this relationship. In order to understand the policies taken by the US, it is first necessary
to analyze the history of the technology, the aspects of nuclear technology that enable
security threats, the history of the US response to those threats, the current US policy on
the issue, and finally, how that policy could be improved. This paper’s overarching
argument is that, because nuclear energy is a necessary component of an international
energy strategy that will address the world’s increasing energy demand, the US should
promote nuclear technology, but only if it is willing to address the risk of proliferation
related to this technology. This analysis concludes by examining three questions. 1)
Should the United States promote the use of nuclear energy? 2) What measures can be
taken to ameliorate the proliferation risks posed by nuclear energy? 3) Is the present
division of labor appropriate within the federal government appropriate to address the
myriad of issues created by the unique nature of nuclear technology?
In order to address those issues, it is necessary to examine the history of the US
response to nuclear energy, the technology that enables nuclear energy, and the current
response to nuclear proliferation.
II.

History in United States: The Between of Military and Civilian Uses of Nuclear
Technology
The nuclear energy industry was the result of the efforts of US military scientists

during the 1930s and 1940s. During this period, the US explored military applications of
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nuclear energy, focusing on how energy could be developed from the splitting of uranium
atoms. The impact of this new area of science would affect all life in the world. In order
to understand the current regulatory framework of nuclear energy, it is first necessary to
understand the origins of the US policy response towards this technology.
A. Domestic Law and Policy
Nuclear energy literally began with a big bang: the attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were the result of the US efforts during World War II. The technology and
science that developed these weapons is, and will always be, related to the energy
resource that followed it. After World War II, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act
of 19462 in order to address the profound implications of this new technology on
America, both militarily and economically. While unsure of the long term implications
of the technology, Congress was concerned with shaping the direction of the industry,
“subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and
security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be
directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living,
strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace.”3
President Eisenhower followed suit in the 1950s with the Atoms for Peace Program
which encouraged peaceful use of nuclear technology and served the political aspirations
of the US during the Cold War. From the beginning of the nuclear era, the federal
government has been concerned with the implications of this technology for security and
foreign policy goals. As a result of this concern, the federal government has sought to
shape the technology through a variety of legal and bureaucratic devices.
2
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1. Atomic Energy Act.
Among the notable aspects of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (AEA) was the
decision by Congress to make the nuclear industry a government monopoly, allowing for
private groups to invest, subject to a great deal of federal oversight.4 The AEA’s purpose
is to regulate the various materials involved in the nuclear process. Under the current
form of the law, the DOE has oversight of source materials5, special nuclear materials6,
and byproducts.7
Congress found two primary motivations. First, there was the need for atonement
after the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which served as an impetus for developing
peaceful applications of nuclear energy.8 Second, and very much ironically, there was a
need to pursue the technology for purposes of the Cold War.9 There was a relationship,
from the beginning, between developments in military and civilian applications of
nuclear technology. For example, the light water reactor, a model frequently used in
American nuclear power plants, was developed by the navy for use on submarines.
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The act initially created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was
responsible for licensing and energy development functions. The Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974 split these functions into the liscencing and energy development functions,10
creating the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Energy Research and
Development Administration (ERDA, the organization which eventually became the
DOE). The NRC is charged, by Congress, with the health and safety aspects of the
industry.
While safety is traditionally a state function, the original AEA was silent on the
matter.

In 1957, the law was amended to allow nominal state involvement in the

regulation of byproducts, source materials, and small quantities of special nuclear
materials.11

States and the NRC sign agreements related to these regulations, after a

finding by the NRC that the state’s radiation control program is congruent with federal
intentions.12 States are also responsible for regulating nuclear energy with regard to their
energy production as part of a utility system.
B. Price Anderson Insurance
Another important step in the process of creating a commercial nuclear industry
was the Price Anderson13 “umbrella” for nuclear power operators. Given the almost
unfathomable cost of a nuclear accident in the context of the American legal system,
Congress realized that the fledgling nuclear industry at the time, which operated on the
similar margins to other utility producers, would be unable to pay the cost of insurance.
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Over the past five decades, Congress has developed a tiered system, in which nuclear
producers share the insurance cost for accidents to a certain amount and Congress agrees
to pay the rest in the event of a catastrophic accident.
C. Nuclear Energy in the courts
The legal system has had a limited response with the challenges of nuclear
energy, interpreting the Atomic Energy Act and the Price Anderson provisions.

In

Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,14 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
the federal government preempted the state authority to regulate nuclear power plant
operation and construction, allowing the AEC’s authority to regulate release from nuclear
plants. Another notable case, In re TMI Litigation Cases Consol. II, discusses the history
of federal regulation of nuclear energy in depth, illustrating the method used to
appropriate responsibility over nuclear energy, such as the Price Anderson system.
The overwhelming theme from the courts theme with regard to nuclear energy,
however, has been one of deference.15 One commentator, Diane Carter Maleson, has
noted that American courts are often very conservative with regard to emerging
technologies and social concerns, comparing the deference of the courts with regard to
nuclear energy to the slow response of the courts to address the problems created by
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industrialization in the 1800s.16 Moreover, Carter notes that this deference is inspired by
judicial trust in the technocratic regime, which she views as a policy choice in of itself:
by deferring to administrative judgment, Carter argues that the court has changed nuclear
energy from an “option” to a “mandate.”17
D. Analysis: Lessons of the Bureaucracy
These cases are particularly notable because they illustrate a unique aspect of the
American nuclear system vis-à-vis that of other nations, namely the impact of the
bureaucratic system of checks and balances that regulate all aspects of American nuclear
technology.

There are lessons to be learned regarding this system for comparative

purposes. In the United States, there is a comprehensive system of checks and balances
to ensure the appropriate divide between the goals and needs of industry and of the
government. The federal government defines interests – security, safety, and an energy
supply – and the appropriate entities – the military, the various civilian government
entities at the state and federal level, the entrepreneurs – act in accord with that policy.
One of the major problems that shapes US nuclear policy is that this sort of
system does not exist in every nation around the world. In one way or another, a few of
the emerging nuclear states lack the sort of technocratic structure to divide those
responsibilities. In some instances, those shortcomings create potential security risks for
the United States, like the problem in Congo, and these sorts of problems are the focus of
this analysis. The next step is discussing how the technology creates those risks.
III.

The Nuclear Energy Process and Military Applications
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Nuclear energy utilizes a relatively simple atomic reaction to generate steam
which creates energy. There are several different technologies that have been developed
to utilize this science and they each warrant specific explanation. These technologies can
be used through a variety of means to develop nuclear weapons.
A. How does Nuclear energy work?
1. Generally
The short answer to the question of how a nuclear reactor works is that it releases
energy from uranium and plutonium, which in turn is used to create heat that in turn heats
water, which finally generates steam. A nuclear reaction creates the heat that leads to the
electricity. There are several different ways to achieve this reaction, but there seems to
be one fundamental model of how to achieve it.
Uranium has very unstable nuclei, some of which are continually breaking up or
disintegrating. When the neutrons within uranium atoms collide with the nuclei of other
uranium atoms, two or three neutrons will be released and the reaction will generate
energy – this is the “fissioning process.” Isotopes of uranium, U-235 and U-238, have
different properties from standard uranium. U-235 can more easily capture a neutron,
fission, and release energy than a reaction, compared to U-238. However, U-238 is
important because it can be used to form the element plutonium, through the absorption
of neutrons.

Nuclei of plutonium fission in a similar manner to uranium and are

frequently used in commercial nuclear reactors. About forty percent of commercial
electricity comes from plutonium.18
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Generally, nuclear reactor has four parts: uranium or a combination of uranium
and plutonium, water, devices that control the rate of fission, and a radiation shield.19
Uranium is usually shaped into small rods – normally referred to as fuel rods – to
improve efficiency. Fuel rods are normally one-half inch in diameter and several feet in
length.
2. Nuclear Fuel
Those who follow the news frequently hear nuclear-related terminology. It is
worth briefly touching on the types of nuclear fuel used in reactors. The most important
ingredient for a nuclear reaction is uranium: a relatively rare element.20 In order to utilize
uranium for many civilian and military applications, uranium must be enriched. Yellow
Cake is processed uranium concentrate, containing seventy to ninety percent uranium
oxide content. It is crushed, or compressed, uranium that is used in the enrichment
process.21
Enriched uranium has a higher U-235 content through a process called isotope
separation: several different methods, such as centrifugation and gas diffusion,22 have
been developed to bring the U-235 content in fuel rods from three percent to five percent
19
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(up from the natural content of seventy one hundredths of a percent).23 This content
allows the fuel rods in a reactor to be placed closer together, allowing for more fission to
occur.24
Plutonium does not occur (in useful amounts) anywhere in nature, at least
anywhere that has been discovered yet. Plutonium, a fundamental ingredient in nuclear
weapons,25 is obtained through a number of processes, two of which warrant specific
attention. Plutonium is a byproduct in all civilian reactors at the moment, although
military reactors are developed to create plutonium more efficiently – much of the
plutonium created in civilian reactors is difficult to utilize for any re-use. Reprocessing
plants, such as Breeder reactors, create plutonium that can be re-used as fuel within the
reactor.
Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) accounts for between two percent and one third of the
nuclear fuel used today.26 It is derived from re-processed plutonium and is generally very
costly to make. A discussion of MOX will be important in the discussion of Cooperative
Threat Reduction below.
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Finally, thorium, another naturally occurring element, has been used in some
nuclear reactors as an alternative to uranium based fuels.27 There are some advocates
who believe it can be developed into fuel that could not be used for nuclear weapons.
B. Reactor Types
A number of processes have been developed to utilize the reactions of uranium.
Each has advantages and disadvantages.
1. Natural Uranium Reactors
Rather than use a uranium isotope, these reactors use the natural form of
uranium.28 This operation requires heavy-water moderator at atmospheric pressure: it is
designed to limit the energy within fast fission neutrons, allowing the small proportion of
uranium-235 nuclei within the material to be fissioned.29 These reactors do not need the
thick steel pressure vessels within other reactors. The advantage of these reactors is that
they do not need the processing that comes with other reactors. The disadvantage is that
they are not as efficient as the more advanced reactors, because they do not use refined
uranium.
2. Water Reactors
In a light water reactor, water enters the reactor and then becomes steam as it
passes through the reactor. These fuel rods are inserted into a reactor in a chamber filled
with water. Water slows the pace of the neurons because they lose energy as the uranium
27
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neutrons react to the hydrogen in the water.30 The water is pumped away from the
uranium rods to carry the heat out of the chamber and to generate the steam that in turn
generates electricity.31 Control rods, normally made of boron, regulate the rate of fission,
use the element boron to absorb excess neutrons within the reactor. The steam created
from the system spins a turbine and energy is created. Similarly, in a pressurized water
reactor, leaves the reactor, and is then passed through the tubes in a heat exchanger; heat
from that water makes its way from the system and boils another, separate, supply of
water.32
One benefit of the system is that it can safely create energy much more efficiently
than natural uranium reactors. One of the benefits of nuclear energy which has not been
specifically mentioned is the relatively low cost of uranium, given the relative amount of
energy one can generate from the material. With this benefit comes a major long term
problem: the limitation of these types of reactors is that there is a limited amount of
uranium in the world. Indeed, some estimates posit that the supply of “easy-to-reach”
material, given current demands, will only last another century.33 Other drawbacks are
common to most reactor types: highly dangerous nuclear waste and the (remote)
possibility that the waste material is reprocessed into a weapon.
3.

Liquid Metal Reactors

A more modern development in nuclear technology attempts to address the
limitation of supply. Liquid metal reactors (“LMRs”), also called Breeder reactors,
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consume less U-235 than plutonium generated, producing a net increase in fissionable
material.
A reader with a basic knowledge of physics might be troubled by this concept,
given the Second Law of Thermodynamics: "in all energy exchanges, if no energy enters
or leaves the system, the potential energy of the state will always be less than that of the
initial state."34 The simple answer to this challenge is that it does not create an unlimited
amount of nuclear energy; fuel rods still must be replaced after some time. Rather, the
difference between this type of reactor and other types that account for the challenge is
that breeder reactors reprocess the waste product of the fission reaction (plutonium) into
fuel that other reactors cannot use. The reactor is able to generate more plutonium than
more traditional reactors because it uses metal sodium as a coolant.
Metal sodium has a higher melting point than water (208°F compared to 32°F).
One of the benefits of this process is that metal sodium does not slow neutrons down as
much as water, making more neutrons available for the U-238 at the capture point, and
thus forming more plutonium.35
In order to separate the useable nuclear fuel from the waste, the spent fuel is
chopped and dissolved through an acid bath process.36 Uranium and plutonium are
recovered and the remaining material is neutralized. This portion of the “fuel cycle
process” is very expensive, requiring a great deal of safety measures given the the highly
radioactive nature of some of the materials.37
34
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In the 1940s, some predicted that the first reactors would be liquid metal reactors.
The U.S. Navy developed water-cooled reactors with a great deal of success, and these
systems were eventually adopted by the US nuclear industry. A number of other nations
have also experimented with the technology – England, France, India, Japan, China, and
Russia – but to little serious success, other than limited commercial use in Russia and
Japan. The Ford and Carter administrations stopped US development of technology, but
the Bush Administration has interest in it.38
The benefits of this process are clear.39 It lowers the cost of producing nuclear
energy and somewhat limits the waste product of the reaction. One of the drawbacks of
this technology is that the fuel rods must be discharged periodically and chemically
reprocessed. A major problem with this detail, as noted by the Ford, Carter, and Clinton
administrations, is that the breeder reactor creates a pure form of plutonium which can be
harnessed for a weapon.40
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4. Integral Fast Reactors
One recent development in the technology, known as the Integral Fast Reactor
(“IFR”), uses a different form of chemical processing and different form of fuel rod.41
The process never creates pure plutonium – instead, it utilizes mixed fragments within the
fuel cycle process, both fission materials and transuranic elements, making diversion very
difficult. In the event the material is stolen, a bomb could not be made without further
chemical separation.42
5. Thorium Reactors
Another relatively recent technology is the Radkowsky Thorium Reactor, which
uses thorium in the fuel rods, in combination with other fissionable pre-made material, to
create a theoretically diversion proof reactor.43 The main limitation with thorium reactors
has been that the process of using thorium is costly and requires the use of pre-made
fissionable material (which often could be reprocessed).

The Radkowsky reactor

addresses this problem by separating the U-235 from the thorium into separate processes,
thus dividing the component into one which creates neutrons for energy and fuel
management.44
41
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B. How can this process be used to develop nuclear weapons?
1. Fuel Rod Theft and Reprocessing
The uranium used in fuel rods cannot be used to make a bomb. The U-235
content in “enriched uranium” is around four or five percent; a mixture of U-235 and U238 would, at least, have to be twenty percent U-235 to be explosive.45 Similarly, the
plutonium that might be in fuel rods would also be difficult to transform into a bomb.
There is no plutonium in fresh fuel rods, so terrorists would have to steal spent fuel. The
spent fuel itself is stored in casks and usually surrounded with security. Even if one
could obtain a used fuel rod, it is extremely difficult to separate plutonium into a pure
form needed to make a bomb. Such a process requires a means of shielding oneself from
a high degree of radiation and the technology and knowledge to separate the material.46
Additionally, the fuel rods within commercial reactors are used for three or four years at a
time, due to their high cost; this leads to many impurities, making it difficult to develop
the material into a weapon.47
The more pertinent threat at the moment comes from advanced nuclear reactors
that create a type of plutonium, through reprocessing that is more useful in weaponmaking.

In certain Soviet-style reactors, like the graphite-water reactor used in

Chernobyl, the tendency was to replace the fuel much more frequently than normal
reactors, as these reactors could generate a relatively large amount of plutonium, for
45
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weapons, while providing energy.48 The sole purpose of traditional reprocessing plants is
to separate plutonium and uranium from the used fuel, so those materials can be re-used:
this means that a nation that can obtain a reprocessing facility has the capability of
creating a great deal of plutonium in a short time.49
2. Alternative Diffusion
Another facet of nuclear technology is that commercial reactors are not a likely
candidate for plutonium processing. For example, plutonium can be processed in a more
covert non-commercial reactor. In North Korea, this has usually been the issue – rather
than develop nuclear reactors for energy purposes, the regime tends to favor more covert
military development.50 The majority of news coverage involving nuclear proliferation
centers on these issues, as a nation state clearly has much more ability in terms of
financing and organization to develop such materials into a weapon. These nations tend
to focus on obtaining dual use technology, attempting to mask their military efforts for
civil operations.
3. Waste
Finally, a fear that developed in the popular media after 9/11 was that terrorists
could somehow obtain other nuclear waste material for use in a “dirty bomb” that would
utilize the radiological effects of the nuclear material. There is no single definition of a
dirty bomb – generally, the term refers to terrorists using nuclear material in a crude, nonconventional form, such as designing a method to expose a civilian to radiation without

48
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utilizing an active fissile reaction. The problem with analyzing the threat from a dirty
bomb is that there is not a simple means of using the material as a weapon.
Most of the scenarios contemplated by security analysts deal with hypotheticals
that have not yet happened. Some studies have calculated little risk to such accidents.51
There are other real life stories that nuclear material has led to some alarming results.52
Whatever the risk, after 9/11, the world is much more cognizant of the risks posed by
terrorism.
IV.

US Policy Actions in Response to the Threat of Reprocessing and Proliferation
The US has developed a number of policies aimed at curbing the threats of

proliferation. They range from technological solutions to diplomatic solutions. While
the US has had some success in the area of curbing proliferation, it appears there is much
more that could be done to address the issue.
A. “Cooperative Threat Reduction” (“CTR”)
A result of the efforts of US Senator Richard Lugar and former Senator Sam
Nunn, the “Nunn-Lugar” program, otherwise known as Cooperative Threat Reduction,
attempts to address the uses of loose nuclear weapon materials in Russia and other
nations. The fear is that Russian nuclear weapon or reactor components could be bought
from, or stolen from, Russian facilities, given their lax security measure. Continuing the

51
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consistent theme of this issue’s complexity, the task of dismantling these weapons has
proven very difficult.53
1. Policy
While plutonium reprocessing is a much publicized portion of the CTR program,
the program is much bigger. It has four broad goals: (1) Destroying nuclear, chemical,
and other weapons of mass destruction; (2) transportation and safe storage of these
weapons and materials; (3) establishing verifiable safeguards with regard to these
weapons and material; and, (4) preventing the diversion of scientific expertise regarding
nuclear technology.54
2. Technical Process
Generally, there are two major nuclear-related processes to the CTR program.
One program buys the enriched uranium from Russian weapons, re-processing it into
nuclear fuel. The problem with this process is that it costs substantially more to produce
MOX fuel for sale than it does to buy the more conventional uranium fuel. To encourage
the use of MOX, the US plans to sell the materials at a price equal to or less than the
uranium fuel that is normally used by domestic reactors.55
Another process deals with the plutonium from Russian weapons. Generally, two
methods are used to address this issue. Some plutonium is re-processed into fuel within
commercial reactors while the rest is treated in a process known as “vitrification,” in
53
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which the material is dissolved within glass. This glass material can be stored in a
secure, neutralizing the threat posed by the material.
3. DOE, DOD, and DOS participation
The DOE is primarily responsible for the technical processes involved with CTR.
The Department of Defense (DOD) shares some responsibility on these technical issues,
but appears to be more of an executive after changes were made to the CTR program
during the Bush administration: the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), part of
the DOD, is primarily responsible for the CTR program.56 The State Department (DOS)
is responsible for the diplomatic aspect of the program.
4. Implementation (and Difficulties)
The policy’s implementation was slow.

The Department of Defense (DOD)

initially had a great deal of discretion with the program’s funds, with the majority of the
funding going towards security measures for the transportation and storage of nuclear
weapons in the United States: Armed Service Procurement Regulations prevented the use
of funding in the former Soviet Union.57

After it became apparent that there were no

incentives in place for Russian nuclear technicians to act in the best interests of Russia
and the U.S., the DOE initiated a program between weapon laboratories in the two
nations.
There have been other failures in the years since the program’s inception. The
Bush Administration has not always been interested in funding the initiative. Prior to
9/11, the Bush Administration tried to cut funding; even with the War on Terrorism, the
56
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Bush Administration has, at times, sought to divert funds for the initiative to other
programs.58 Finally, one of the great limitations of the program is that it does not address
the limitations of nuclear facilities in other nations with any great magnitude.

For

example, the CTR program does not address the problems with nuclear reactors in
nations such Congo, Uzbekistan, and Ghana.59

C. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,60 member states agreed to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is largely a mixture of commitments regarding
the oversight of member states (programs which have been in existence since the 1960s)
and more bold commitments (like the quixotic agreement that all members will
eventually disarm their nuclear weapons in Article VI).
Also, the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) is enabled to inspect the
commercial power activities of member nations. The treaty underscores the relationship
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between commercial nuclear power and the security risks posed by nuclear technology.
Another unique function of the NPT is the requirement that all member nations be willing
to share nuclear energy technology.61
This treaty illustrates an interesting worldview of the 1960s. The US and USSR
were concerned with winning over less developed nations that were in need of energy.
These nations were limited, due to a lack of natural resources and their large populations,
in their ability to develop infrastructure and acquire technology. The US and USSR were
more than willing to provide development assistance, taking on such projects as the
Aswan High Dam in Egypt and the projects and assistance provided by the World Bank.
Nuclear energy was another bargaining chip in the efforts to obtain allies, with the US
reactors supplying assistance to nations like Congo, and the Cold War powers’
willingness to sign a treaty guaranteeing that interest.
What happened to this enthusiasm for developing nuclear energy technology?
The most obvious answer is that the Cold War ended, and, to a large degree, so did the
US need to battle for the allegiance of those powers. For the US, the post-Cold War
world was no longer bi-polar, but rather fraught with pariah states like Iran, North Korea,
and Iraq, who would develop reactors for military purposes.62 This caused a shift from
concerns over international goodwill to a concern over immediate security threats.
Secondary causes were the loss of interest in nuclear energy in the US, with fears of
accidents after Chernobyl, the media coverage of Three Mile Island, and the perceived
risks of nuclear energy following 9/11.
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C. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The IAEA, based in Vienna, Austria, is a United Nations agency that came under
fire in the months leading up to the 2002 invasion of Iraq. The IAEA has three general
functions: promoting safeguards and verification, promoting safety and security, and
promoting science and technology.
In terms of promoting safeguards and verifications, the IAEA has two broad
functions.

It inspects the nuclear-related facilities of member states and, under the

auspices of UN Security Council resolutions, has maintained a presence in Iraq to
monitor nuclear-related events there (although that function no longer exists).63
With regard to the safety and security function, the IAEA oversees that member
states have safe nuclear equipment: generally, the IAEA sets safety standards for nuclear
facilities.64 In the security area, the IAEA attempts to ensure that nuclear materials
within member states are kept out of the hands of terrorists and those who might obtain
the technology for military applications.65
The IAEA, following the philosophy of the NPT, is also mobilized to promote
science and technology: the IAEA maintains, as part of its mission statement, that it will
promote exchanges of knowledge regarding nuclear technology towards developing
nations (for energy and social benefits) and promote the research and development of
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technology related to corresponding nuclear technology issues (food, safety, and radiation
exposure).66
The IAEA is severely limited in its amount of funding – its $100 million budget is
on par with that of a midsize American city.67 Moreover, the budget has seen no real
growth in seventeen years, even as the IAEA’s mission would seemingly be more
important in a post-Cold War world.68 The IAEA’s image took some damage during the
buildup to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as the Bush Administration’s public relations teams
mocked Hans Blix and international inspection methods used within Iraq.
D. Diversion-proof fuel
A relatively recent proposal would focus on a method that would make nuclear
power plant spent fuel useless for weapon purposes. By putting an isotope of americium,
Am-241, in all new fuel rods, neutrons can be captured while the rods are in the reactor.
A curium isotope, Cm-242, would be created, and, in turn, this material would eventually
deteriorate into Pu-238. If this process is timed appropriately, the theory is that it would
render spent fuel from weapons useless.69
There are two policy concerns related to such a solution. First of all, it would be
necessary to create a treaty system in which fuel fabrication systems were open to
inspection. Second, and a reality that advocates of such a system are quick to point out,
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is that there are very few fuel fabrication plants in the world, making the inspection easy
to control.70
E. Export Controls
The DOE has oversight of the export of nuclear technology, including nuclear
reactors.71 Failure to comply with the export controls carries stiff penalties, such as jail
time and fines.
F. Direct Foreign Policy Measures
The actions of the US through international negotiations and other foreign policy
acts must be mentioned in any discussion of proliferation. In the past, the US has used a
variety of different strategies, depending on the situation. In the case of Brazil and
Argentina, the US joined members of the international community to negotiate a series of
agreements in which the two nations would join the NPT and agree to mutual verification
measures.72

In 1994, North Korea and the US agreed to shut down of a North Korean

reprocessing plant in exchange for two light water reactors less suited for weapon
making.73 Of course, since that time, the US has used a less conciliatory method with
North Korea, instead choosing to implicitly threaten military action. A more “hard line”
approach is that taken by the US with regard to Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear
technology.
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V. Analysis
The following is a brief commentary of several major emerging issues related to
nuclear energy, using the information presented above.
1) Should the United States promote the use of nuclear energy?
This issue turns on the extent to which one believes there is a technologically
feasible solution to the reprocessing problem within nuclear technology. The Ford and
Carter Administrations concluded that there was no such solution and that the risks of
plutonium proliferation outweighed the benefit of the technology and thus, arguably,
dealt a serious blow to the research and development aspects of nuclear technology, in
turn contributing to the change in US policy regarding the promotion of the technology
worldwide. It would be interesting to know the feeling of those administrations regarding
reprocessing technology like IFRs in making such decisions.
The benefits of nuclear energy are clear. It can provide relatively cheap and
emission-free energy in places that lack sufficient natural resources to provide for their
population. As international energy demand continues to rise, nuclear energy is a clear
answer to offset the corresponding rise in cost.
Furthermore, the promotion of such technology, if safe, while not serving an
ideological interest like it did during the Cold War, could serve a more prophylactic
measure in the future. Some of the most frightening nations in the world – North Korea,
Belarus, and Afghanistan – are also extremely limited in their energy infrastructure.
Even if they could grow, these nations often lack the capability to develop the basic
services, like sufficient electric access, needed for successful development.
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access could serve as preventive measure to the social problems that come with a poor
economy and contribute to the malaise that enables a regime like the one in North Korea.
While hardly a guaranteed solution, it seems that nuclear energy could offset those
problems. Proliferation safe reactors, whether they be IFRs, thorium reactors, or simple
light water reactors (which often make the cost of reprocessing too great), would offset
some of these concerns. Better international monitoring could also contribute a great deal
to the proliferation concern.
2) What measures can be taken to ameliorate the proliferation risks posed by nuclear
energy?
Proliferation safe reactors, whether they be IFRs or simple light water reactors
(which often make the cost of reprocessing too great), would offset proliferation
concerns.

US policymakers should at least evaluate the possibilities of these

technologies, rather than relegate them to the present status as Cold War relics.
Better international monitoring could also contribute a great deal to the
proliferation concern.

At present, the IAEA is woefully under-funded, given its

magnificent responsibility of overseeing the safety of nuclear technology around the
world.

Changes to the organization, whether through an increase in funding or a

reassignment of the task to another organization, are necessary.
Finally, the US must choose whether it intends to enforce the NPT, an
international agreement that sought to limit the military applications of nuclear
technology. The US has, at times, failed to live up to other obligations of the agreement
such as the nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). If the US wants to seriously pursue the
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concerns of nuclear proliferation, it ought to comply with the NPT and encourage other
nations to follow suit.
3) Is the present division of labor appropriate within the federal government
appropriate to address the myriad of issues created by the unique nature of nuclear
technology?
Given the analysis presented above, there should be little doubt that the federal
government’s oversight of nuclear issues should be re-thought, particularly in the realm
of nuclear proliferation. The US has failed in implementing a clear strategy to prevent
future abuses of nuclear technology.
One idea, following 9/11, is to create a separate White House post, overseeing the
myriad of DOE, DOD, and DOS programs related to the international trade of nuclear
materials.74

This “nuclear proliferation czar” would be designed to coordinate the

respective efforts of the various foreign and domestic policymaking bodies involved with
proliferation issues, with the overall goal of developing a unified policy.
The Bush Administration has also proclaimed a “Global Threat Reduction
Initiative,” which would expand the Nunn-Lugar program.

The program would

compensate for the external limitations of the existing CTR program, expanding the
DOE’s anti-proliferation efforts beyond Russia. The success of this program remains to
be seen.75
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In line with the issue of coordination, the US, if it chooses to promote nuclear
energy, ought to be a leader in developing safer civilian applications of the technology,
promoting the use of technology like integral fast reactors, thorium reactors, and
diversion proof fuel. Some have argued that sharing this technology is an obligation
under the NPT.76
VI. Conclusion: Two Broad Observations on Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Proliferation
This analysis also warrants two additional observations on nuclear energy worth
noting. First, one of the more striking aspects of the last two decades is the lack of
legitimate research and development into nuclear energy. The US has always been a
world leader in technological development and, not surprisingly, research and
development into nuclear energy began to slow around the time that the US ended its
research.

In the US, following the decision to ban reprocessing, there was some

experimentation with IFRs, but even that research has been dormant for over a decade.
As the development has subsided, so too has the US interest in nuclear energy, given the
prospect of more decommissioning of plants on the horizon without an offsetting increase
in the number of plant applications. There have been no new ideas and thus no new
policies. If the argument that nuclear energy is a necessary step to offset the increased
international demand is correct, then any policy that does not take those technological
development issues into account is a mistake.
Second, the problems related to nuclear energy and proliferation will not go away
under the current policy framework.

Foreign nations will still need energy and,

occasionally, a state will attempt to increase its hegemony through the development of
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nuclear weapons.77

This reality demands vigilance regarding the problems of

proliferation. One commentator, ranking nuclear proliferation as the most serious risk
associated with nuclear energy, explained a method for evaluating the risk associated
with nuclear proliferation:
[The] risk, in the formal sense, is the product of the probability of a
harmful event times the consequences of the event if it takes place. Now,
we do not know exactly how much the spread of nuclear power
contributes to the probability of nuclear war, but it is certainly not
inconceivable that the probability of nuclear war is already [one percent]
per year and that the spread of nuclear power could double that figure in
the short term . . . If nuclear power adds a probability of [one percent] per
year to the chances of nuclear war, and recognizing that the consequences
of nuclear war could include the deaths . . . of billions of people, then the
“expected value” associated with that risk – that is, the probability times
the consequences – is very large indeed.78

There is no clear way to evaluate the risk of a nuclear accident, much less the risk
posed by nuclear proliferation. The lack of a tangible means of evaluating the probability
of such incidents is not a reason to ignore the problem. If nuclear energy is a necessary
step in addressing the rising energy demand worldwide, it will take an investment in the
future to protect the world from dangers posed by nuclear proliferation.

Allowing

examples like the Kinshasa reactor mentioned in the introduction to discourage a policy
that pursues the safe development of nuclear energy is a mistake.
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